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UNION SALTS AS ADMINISTRATIVE PRIVATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Michael C. Duff *
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last two decades the labor law community has debated,
at times bitterly, the legitimacy of union salting campaigns. 1 Salts, the
agents of these campaigns, are professional union organizers who apply for,
and sometimes obtain – often surreptitiously – employment with non-union
employers for, among other reasons, the purpose of persuading the
employer's employees to unionize. This article argues that salts have served
a legitimate function that is often overlooked: by exposing unlawful, antiunion employment practices – especially unlawful hiring practices – salts
facilitate the implementation of federal labor law policies designed to
maintain industrial peace and to equalize employee bargaining power. 2
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West
Chester University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. I am thankful to
Jeffrey Hirsch, Victoria Klein, Paul Secunda, and Michael Yelnosky for their helpful
suggestions. All errors are mine. During the research and writing of this article, I received
generous financial support from the Dyekman Law Faculty Research Fund, for which I am
grateful.
1

See Comment, Organizing Worth its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union
Organizers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Victor J. Van Bourg, Ellyn Moscowitz,
Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political Implications of Placing Paid Union Organizers
in the Employer's Workplace, 16 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 1 (1998); R. Wayne Estes,
Andrea E. Joseph, Missing Analytical Link in Supreme Court's Salting Decision Disturbs
Balance of Union-Management Rights: A Critical Analysis of NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, 30 IND. L. REV. 445 (1997); Pamela A. Howlett, Salt in the Wound? Making a
Case and Formulating a Remedy When an Employer Refuses to Hire Union Organizers, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 201 (2003); Stuart R. Buttrick, Brian R. Garrison, Cut Back on Your Salt:
Recent Developments Regarding Union Salts - Toering Electric Co. and Oil Capitol Sheet
Metal, Inc., 24 LAB. LAW 71 (2008); Note, Salt Anyone?: The United States Supreme
Court Holds that Paid Union Organizers Qualify as Employees Under the NLRA in NLRB
v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 42 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 243 (1997); Note, Hold the Salt:
Should Non-Genuine Applicants Be Treated as Employees Under the NLRA? – Toering
Electric Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 2007 WL 2899733 (September 29, 2007), 77 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1247 (2009).
2
See the National Labor Relations Act as amended, Section 1, which states in relevant
part:
***
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
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When salts play this role by filing and pursuing charges at the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) – the federal administrative agency
regulating labor relations in the private sector of the United States – they act
as administrative private attorneys general.
From the outset, I want to make clear that I am not speaking of a
"private attorney general" in the narrowest sense. The most common
discussion respecting private attorneys general centers on issues of whether
Congress has designated private parties to bring court suits in the public
interest under particular statutory regimes and, if it has, whether those
designees have standing to sue or are entitled to attorneys fees. 3 Here, more
broadly, I follow Professor William Rubenstein in conceiving a private
attorney general as “a placeholder for any person who mixes private and
public features in the adjudicative arena.” 4 This expanded conception
appropriately frames the private attorney general discussion and licenses me
to speak sensibly of an "administrative" private attorney general. 5 Salts act
for private ends, but their actions serve public law objectives. Thus, they
mix private and public features, but in an administrative rather than judicial
adjudicative arena. Accordingly, I make no claim herein that Congress has
authorized private enforcement of the NLRA. Rather, my argument is that
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
***
3

“The ‘private attorney general’ concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff
is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorneys fees, if he has advanced the
policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons.”
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990) (subdefinition of "Attorney General")
(quoting Dasher v. Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 64 F.R.D. 722, 729 (N.D. Ga. 1974))
4
William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General Is — and Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2131 (2004) (positing a broad definition of private
attorney general and mapping varieties of private attorneys general according to the mixes
of public and private functions performed)
5
Professor Kim has taken a similar approach in arguing that the law should extend
support to undocumented workers on a private attorney general theory. See Kathleen Kim,
The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil
Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (2009) .
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the NLRB can justify the utilization of the private charge filing and
investigative activities of salts, particularly in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s conclusion that salts are bona fide NLRA employees. 6
Salts have the potential to function as private attorneys general in labor
relations by stimulating enforcement of NLRA provisions forbidding
unlawful refusals to hire, a notoriously difficult violation of law to police. 7
In the hiring context, in which job applicants are less likely to pursue legal
action than established employees fired for unlawful reasons, private
attorneys general would be particularly useful for achieving enforcement of
legal protections. 8 Job applicants who are unlawfully discriminated against
often have a diminished sense of grievance relative to unlawfully
discharged employees because they have not yet invested time and emotion
in an employment relationship. 9 Further, unless applicants are unusually
sophisticated they will not suspect discrimination: their dealings with an
offending employer will have been brief; they will be unfamiliar with the
employer's hiring processes and applicant pools; and they are unlikely to be
met with overt discrimination. 10 Applicants who are out of work must
obviously move on with their job searches. 11 Even if they harbor suspicions
of discrimination, they may not have time to act on it. 12 If an applicant
quickly procures a job with a different employer, that very success will
mitigate backpay to the point where pursuing a claim is not worthwhile. 13
Meager backpay, operating in tandem with administrative delay and the
eventual need for court enforcement in the case of doggedly recalcitrant
employers, discourage traditional claimants. 14
Taking up the problem of under-enforcement of refusal to hire
violations under the NLRA, Part I provides some background and context
6

See infra n.18 and accompanying text.
Professor Michael Yelnosky has described the phenomenon of under-enforcement in
connection with unlawful refusals to hire as "the enforcement void." Michael J. Yelnosky,
Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in
Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403 (1993).
Salts have helped to fill this void in the context of the NLRA.
8
See Yelnosky, Enforcement Void, supra n.7, at 412; Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful
Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 97, 133-35 (1991) (discussing similar problems in the context of common law
actions).
9
Yelnosky, Enforcement Void, supra n.7, at 512.
10
Id.
11
Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire at 134
12
Yelnosky, Enforcement Void at 512
13
Id.
14
For a general discussion of delays inherent in the NLRB process see William B.
Gould IV., The NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the Bush II
Aftermath, 26 BERKELY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 309, 317 (2005).
7
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for the salting debate, and introduces and expands upon the NLRB's first
discussion of salts considered as private attorneys general. Part II explores
the private attorney general concept more expansively, discusses the
NLRB's limited understanding of it, and explores the legal contours of the
private attorney general mechanism in administrative agency enforcement.
Part III considers whether salts should be stripped of the protections of the
NLRA because their actions are “indefensible," even assuming, as I will
argue, that they otherwise serve useful and even essential enforcement
purposes by functioning as administrative private attorneys general. The
Article's ultimate conclusion is that salts permissibly assist unions, and
thereby the public, in preventing 15 unfair practices prohibited by the NLRA.
I. SALTING
Before considering the private attorney general argument, a preliminary
general discussion of salting is in order. To that end, this Part will explore
the background, context and policy surrounding salting and consider in
detail the NLRB’s most recent substantial discussion of salting in the
Toering Electric case.
A. Background, Context, Policy
Salting activities may be either "overt"—the salt reveals his or her union
affiliation at the time of job application, or at some point in time during the
15

Section 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160, broadly authorizes the NLRB both to
prevent unfair labor practices and to remedy those practices after they have been
committed. Despite possession of this broad authority, the NLRB is not empowered to
impose "punitive" remedies. See Republic Steel Corp., 311 U.S. 7 (1940). The weakness
of NLRA remedies has been created by the courts’ strategically slavish refusal to impose
“punitive” remedies, see Michael Weiner, Note, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor
Practices? Reassessing the Punitive–Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 1579 (2005), and the Supreme Court authorized this disregard of
congressional mandate by choosing "to avoid entering into the bog of logomachy . . . by
debate about what is 'remedial' and what is 'punitive' . . . [and] to stick closely to the
direction of the Act by considering what order does . . . and what order does not, bear
appropriate relation to the policies of the [NLRA].” N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,
344 U.S. 344 (1953). In the absence of a bona fide remedial regime, unions will continue
to have no choice but to develop innovative strategies for implementing the original intent
of labor law. Compare Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26
BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 223-25 (2005) (“The NLRA itself and its policies
embody values that were intended to, and still can, transform our workplaces and our
society.") with Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor
Law, 50 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 515, 517 (2006) ("No matter how many resources unions
pour into organizing, or how creative their tactics, unions will continue to decline as long
as they remain within the constraints of the law.") .
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ensuing employment, or "covert"—union affiliation is never disclosed but is
ultimately discovered by the employer. 16 In either instance, the disclosed or
discovered union affiliation is eventually alleged as the motive for an
adverse employment action – a discharge or a refusal to hire – subsequently
taken against the salt, who is either a job applicant or a hired employee,
depending on the circumstances.
As a general proposition, the union activities of salts are protected under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
That is, if salts are
discriminated against with regard to hire or tenure of employment, for the
purpose of discouraging membership in a labor organization, 17 nothing with
respect to applicants’ or employees’ status as salts should impact the finding
of a violation of law. 18 Controversy has arisen when the objectives of union
salts are not solely to obtain employment with a targeted employer for the
purpose of persuading employees to join a union; but are allegedly also, or
even primarily, to inflict "injury" upon the employer. 19For example, some
courts have concluded that “‘salting’ . . . may be found to be unprotected if
the purported organizational activity is a subterfuge used to further purposes
unrelated to organizing, undertaken in bad faith, designed to result in
sabotage, or designed to drive the employer out of the area or out of
business.” 20 Nevertheless, most courts appear resigned to the now
16

For a discussion of the modern design and tactical objectives of salting campaigns
by one of the strategy’s progenitors, see generally Michael D. Lucas, Salting and Other
Union Tactics: A Unionist’s Perspective, JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH, VOLUME
XVIII, Number 1 (Winter 1997).
17
In apparent violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which states in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . .
18

N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90-98 (1995) (upholding
NLRB's determination that salts fall within statutory definition of employee).
19
The definition of injury has been hotly in dispute. Employers have argued that they
are injured when, during the course of a salting campaign, they are required to obtain legal
counsel to defend against charges of unlawful conduct under the NLRA or other statutes.
See e.g., Examining Union ‘‘Salting’’ Abuses and Organizing Tactics That Harm The U.S.
Economy: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on
Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (Statement of Sam Johnson, Chairman,
House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations, Comm. on Education and the
Workforce) ("Certain unions use ‘‘salts’’ to cause deliberate harm to businesses by
increasing their costs and forcing them to spend time, energy, and money to defend
themselves against frivolous charges, and sometimes, to run employers out of business.")
But, as I will discuss further in Section III.D. infra, clearly non-meritorious charges will
probably be dismissed and "injuries" resulting from violating the law are entirely
appropriate.
20
Progressive Electric v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d 538, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2006), quoting
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established rule that “[a]n employee does not lose his protected status
merely because he is a salt." 21
Notwithstanding the doctrinally protected status of salts, the protection
is illusory at the administrative level unless the NLRB opts to deploy
resources to make the protection real. To a significant degree, the NLRB
has not devoted adequate resources to the task, rendering salts' nominal
coverage under the statute largely chimerical. 22 The erosion of the
protection is not exclusively attributable to the NLRB, however, and is part
of a larger phenomenon. Courts have signaled that it is acceptable to deny
NLRA remedies to unpopular claimants. 23 In perhaps the most recent
celebrated example of this tendency, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, for
dubious policy reasons, to deny remedies to unauthorized immigrant
workers who are victims of anti-union discrimination, despite its threshold
determination that their lack of lawful citizenship did not render them nonemployees under the NLRA. 24 That unpersuasive judicial accommodation
Casino Ready Mix, 321 F.3d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The D.C. Circuit has tended to
include all of these activities under the category “disabling conflict.” Progressive Electric
at 553. The NLRB’s original explication of the category, however, was merely that an
employer was not required to hire a salt who was also a member of a union engaged in a
strike against the employer. Absent that narrow limitation salting activity would not be
considered a disabling conflict. Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230-31
(1992). Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s discussion of the “disabling conflict” defense in
Casino Ready Mix, supra at 1198, the NLRB had not at the time that case was decided
expanded the defense to include “organizational activity [that] is a subterfuge used to
further purposes unrelated to organizing, undertaken in bad faith, designed to result in
sabotage, or designed to drive the employer out of the area or out of business.” Id. The
NLRB cases the court cited for the proposition either never discussed the issue, Braun
Electric Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 1 (1997), or discussed the issue in terms of rejecting various
factual contentions raised by an employer arguing that the disabling conflict defense should
be expanded. M. J. Mechanical Services, 324 N.L.R.B. 812, 813-14 (1997)
21
Contractors Labor Pool, 323 F.3d 1051, 1061 (D.C. Cr. 2003)
22
Michael J. Hilkin, Note, The NLRB’s Oil Capitol and Toering Decisions and Their
Effects on Unionization and American Labor Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1051, 1067 (2009)
(“[B]ecause the NLRB’s legal protections are now virtually worthless to unions and salts,
ULP charges of union-salting discrimination will probably decrease.”)
23
Of course, judicial erosion of labor law is not new, nor is it a novelty to level this
accusation. For general critiques of the judiciary in this regard see James Gray Pope, How
American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518
(2004); JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 24 (1983); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
24
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). In Hoffman, the
Court held that an unauthorized worker found by the NLRB to have been unlawfully laid
off was not entitled to back pay, the only significant remedy available in the circumstances.
See Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality at Last for Immigrant
Workers? 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 394 (forthcoming 2010) (“However, the sad truth is,
rather than creating an injury unique to immigrants, Hoffman Plastic is better seen as part
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of labor law to purported immigration policy, not law, has had profound,
anarchistic aftershocks. 25 I include among the repercussions the NLRB’s
recent treatment of salts. Rather than resisting the judicial assault, the
NLRB has, on the contrary, needlessly exacerbated it through a selfimposed scaling back of salting remedies, and through unnecessary
prolongation of the investigation of salting cases. 26 The result of these
unfortunate administrative innovations has been to create an agency culture
of death by delay. 27
Opponents of salting obviously applaud these developments. 28 But
of the long American tradition of judicial hostility toward unions and labor law.”)
25
See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal
Labor Policy, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 32-34 (2003) (arguing that Hoffman Plastic
represents a form of anarchism because it acts as a general invitation to ignore the law).
26
Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (2007) (eliminating, solely with
respect to salts, presumption that applicant discriminated against is owed backpay from
date of unlawful refusal to hire until valid offer of reinstatement made, significantly
reducing backpay award in most cases); Toering Electric Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225 (2007)
(holding that salt must be “genuinely interested” in seeking to establish an employment
relationship in order to qualify as employee protected by NLRA against anti-union hiring
discrimination). It is true, however, that even prior to Hoffman the NLRB's preliminary
administrative investigations afforded higher priority to discharges, "permanent loss of
employment cases," than to refusal to hire cases, which include the typical salting case. See
NLRB Casehandling Manual 11740 for the most recent articulation of the policy. But an
increasing variety of cases are being squeezed into higher priority Category III cases, see
National Labor Relations Board, Office of the Inspector General, IMPACT ANALYSIS,
Report No. OIG-AMR-54-07-01, March 2007, and I would argue that this has had the
effect of banishing non-Category III cases–including salting cases–to an even more remote
investigative hinterland. Many of these developments were the products of the Board
dominated by appointees of George W. Bush, and the most egregious of them may be
overturned in the near future by the newly-constituted Board dominated by appointees of
Democrat Barack Obama. However, it is difficult to characterize the NLRB's view of
salting during Democrat Bill Clinton's tenure as favorable, so it is far from clear what the
new Board will do.
27
See Bishop v. N.L.R.B., 502 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1974) (“If the apothegm that justice
delayed is justice denied is applicable to labor disputes, then this bout of administrative and
judicial sparring cannot have a very salutary conclusion . . .”).
28
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, LABOR, IMMIGRATION &
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS DIVISION, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION:WHAT CHANGES TO EXPECT 27 (September
2009)
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/e33a6wbi7o6ue773mrfri4wcpb2tjyzlhorvdlgcbf
dsrvelzc54sp6wi7ob3gzsoiw7rgsgzwgmm3j3lqpjrloe3ef/090915_nlrb_report.pdf.
(“By
requiring the General Counsel to adduce proof that the salts have a genuine interest in
employment, Toering Electric has reduced such abusive tactics as batched applications,
improper forms of conduct at job interviews and past employment records which clearly
demonstrate that the salts are not interested in, and would not accept, employment if
offered, but simply want to organize the employer or foster litigation.”) It is of course
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supporters of a vibrant labor relations regime should hesitate before
celebrating, for salts have aggressively pursued refusal to hire cases. It is
doubtful that anyone else would be willing to systematically root out
unlawful hiring practices, the prevention of which the Supreme Court long
ago identified as critical to the process of union organization:
Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of men is a dam to self
organization at the source of supply. The effect of such discrimination is not
confined to the actual denial of employment; it inevitably operates against the
whole idea of the legitimacy of organization. In a word, it undermines the
principle which . . . is recognized as basic to the attainment of industrial
peace. 29

In the most basic sense, if employers may with impunity discriminate
against union salts because of their union affiliation, or because they seek to
assist unions, 30 the right of all employees to be free from anti-union
discrimination is substantially undermined. 31
In litigation, the nature of an inquiry into salts' organizational objectives
is a function of burden shifting. 32 In the classical approach initial focus is
placed on an employer's motivation for refusing to hire a union affiliated
applicant. Establishment of anti-union motive shifts the burden to the
employer to prove that it would not have hired the applicant
notwithstanding union affiliation. 33 The applicant's motivation for applying
lawful – indeed it is protected – for any employee to “simply want to organize the
employer.” Furthermore, an applicant not accepting a job offer would not be able to argue
that an unlawful refusal to hire had transpired.
29
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941)
30
See N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 832 (1984) (" [T]he acts of
joining and assisting a labor organization, which § 7 [of the NLRA] explicitly recognizes
as concerted, are related to collective action in essentially the same way that the invocation
of a collectively bargained right is related to collective action.") (emphasis supplied)
31
Although salting discussions are customarily focused on refusal-to-hire issues, a
common situation involves the covert salt, who is —in the typical scenario—promptly fired
upon discovery. The longer the duration of a covert salt's acceptable pre-discharge
employment, the easier the analysis of the case, for the inherent justification for not
employing salts is that they will not perform as "bona fide" employees, a justification that
could not be reasonably maintained in an instance of sustained adequate employment.
32
The NLRB's prosecutor is known as the "General Counsel." If an administrative
investigation persuades a local regional office that a violation of the NLRA has occurred,
the General Counsel tries the case, absent settlement, to an administrative law judge (ALJ).
Either party to the administrative adjudication may appeal the decision of the ALJ to the
NLRB's full five-member Board in Washington D.C. See N.L.R.A. Section 3(d); Board's
Rules and Regulations Sec. 101.1 et seq.
33
This had been the NLRB’s approach prior to its adventures in reaction to successful
union salting campaigns. Compare C & R Coal Co., 266 NLRB 208 (1983) (shifting
burden to employer once it was shown that refusal to hire was motivated by anti-union
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is irrelevant because the employer has already been established as a
wrongdoer. 34
Over the last decade, however, probably in response to political
pressure, 35 the NLRB has required preliminarily proof of the bona fides of a
job applicant in order to establish a refusal to hire violation. 36 This
backwards analysis circumvents the Supreme Court's Town & Country
opinion. 37 The question of whether a salt is a “genuine” applicant is a
circumlocution of the question of whether a salt is “really” a statutory
employee, a question that the Court has already answered in the
affirmative. 38 No preliminary proof of super-employee status should be
required to make out a prima facie case. 39 The NLRB's self-inflicted
maneuvering revealed an alignment of the George W. Bush Board with
hostile circuit courts 40 in wrongly equating conduct found ethically
animus and at least one job was available to applicant) with FES, 331 N.L.R.B. 9 (2000)
(shifting to General Counsel the employer’s historical burden of establishing hiring plans
and applicant’s qualifications for employment).
34
See Merit Electric, 328 NLRB 212 (1999) (affirming that after establishment of
unlawful motive for refusal to hire burden shifted to employer to prove it would not have
hired applicant notwithstanding union affiliation). In the former approach the employer
was able to argue that the applicant would not have accepted a job if offered, was not
qualified to perform a job, or that no job continued to exist, but it had the burden of
establishing those propositions. See e.g. M.J. Mechanical Services, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 812,
816 (1997) (entertaining but rejecting claim, following establishment of anti-union animus,
that applicants were not "impressive" and were "not really seeking employment").
35
See, e.g., Union Salting–Organizing Against Small Business: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Workforce, Empowerment and Government Programs of the Comm. of the H.
Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2005).
36
See infra at Section I.B.
37
See supra n.18 and accompanying text
38
Id.
39
For a useful analysis of this development see Member Fox's partial dissent in FES,
331 N.L.R.B. 9, 31:
[W]hat is at stake in the allocation of burdens under [the NLRB's traditional
burden shifting mechanism] is which side bears the risk that the influence of legal
and illegal motives cannot be separated. Under Wright Line [the NLRB's seminal
case on burden allocation], that risk is properly placed on the employer, because
he has been shown to have acted with an unlawful motive. If he is unable to come
forward with evidence sufficient to persuade the factfinder that he would have
taken the same action for lawful reasons, he cannot escape liability. Under the
majority's formulation for refusal-to-hire cases, at least part of the risk of
nonpersuasion is on the General Counsel rather than the employer. I see no reason
for such a departure from the basic principles of Wright Line in refusal-to-hire
cases.
40

Until 2007, the circuit courts have decided the bona fide applicant issue unevenly.
Compare N.L.R.B. v. D.S.E. Concrete Forms, 21 F.3d 1109 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding
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repugnant on personal grounds with conduct that is unprotected for
articulable statutory reasons. 41
Despite the NLRB's apparent contempt for salting, sound policy reasons
support relentless focus on employers' motivations in refusal to hire cases.
An employers' unlawful refusal to hire, whatever a particular applicant's
motivation for applying, would reasonably tend to "interfere with, restrain,
and coerce" 42 other employees (who knew of the employer’s motivation) in
the exercise of their statutory rights. 43 When an employer is permitted to
act openly with an unlawful motivation, the fact that an applicant had a
"nontraditional" motivation is not likely the lesson that employees
observing surrounding events are likely to draw. On the contrary,
employees will perceive that union affiliated employees need not apply,
and, in the words of the Phelps Dodge Court, the act of refusal "inevitably
operates against the whole idea of the legitimacy of organization." 44
Additionally, focus on employers' motivations in the salting context would
aid the woefully under-resourced NLRB in preventing unfair labor
practices 45 through modestly creative use of the typically limited statutory
NLRB’s pre-Town and Country conclusion that applicants were bona fide despite union’s
changing employment rules for its members and submission of applications en masse) and
N.L.R.B. v. Smucker Co., 130 Fed. Appx. 596 (3rd Cir. 2005) (“Thus, although in applying
for the job [the applicants] were working as salts with the ‘ulterior motive of trying to
organize [the employer] from the inside,’ . . . such a fact, in-and-of-itself, is of no moment)
with N.L.R.B. v. Leading Edge Aviation Services, Inc., 212 Fed. Appx. 193 (4th Cir. 2007)
(reaffirming circuit court’s requirement that NLRB establish the bona fides of applicants
for purposes of court enforcement of NLRB orders respecting refusal to hire violations).
41
The NLRB has had mixed results with respect to its "moral" pronouncements.
Compare NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (upholding NLRB's
determination that underlying employee conduct was unprotected by NLRA because
"disloyal" and "indefensible") with N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361
U.S. 477 (1960) (rejecting NLRB's partial reliance on public opprobrium as justification
for finding union's nontraditional strike tactics unlawful)
42
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer * * * to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . . .” Section 7 states: “Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from . . . such activities”
43
See Tradesmen International, 351 N.L.R.B. 399, 404 (2007) (imposing enhanced
remedy because employer unlawfully disseminated to non-union employees that purpose of
facially neutral hiring practices was in fact to discriminate against salts)
44
See supra n.30 and accompanying text.
45
Although the NLRA clearly authorizes the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices,
the authority of the agency to effectively deter unlawful conduct has been severely
circumscribed by the courts. See Weiner, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices?
supra n.15 (“While the case law attempting to delineate the Board's remedial power is
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remedies of instatement and backpay. 46
Having discussed in broad strokes the NLRB’s recent shifts in position
on salting cases, the discussion will now focus more closely on the case
representing the culmination of the change in the NLRB’s perspective on
salting.
B.

Toering Electric

In Toering Electric Company, 47 the NLRB took up its most substantial
revisiting of the salting issue since its FES decision in 2000. 48 Perhaps the
outcome of the case was never in doubt, for it was one of sixty-one
decisions handed down in a single month that were adverse to the interests
of organized labor. 49 Simply put, the case severely limited the ability of the
NLRB’s General Counsel to prevail in salting cases. In the course of
dealing that blow to salting campaigns, however, the NLRB's politically
divided factions explicitly took on the issue explored more fully in this
article: whether salts serve a private attorney general role in a manner that is
permissible under the NLRA. In the ensuing subsections I first take up a
general exposition of the case followed by a narrower consideration of the
NLRB’s discussion of the analogy of salts to anti-discrimination “testers”
utilized in other statutory regimes. The tester analogy brings to the
forefront the question of salts’ utilization as private attorneys general.
1.

The Case

The central issue in Toering amounted to an only slightly modified
rehashing of the statutory employee question considered in the Supreme
Court's 1995 Town and Country opinion. In Town and Country, the most
terribly inconsistent, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress aimed to
create a statutory scheme that would deter unfair labor practices.”)
46
Under the NLRA, the NLRB does not investigate alleged unfair labor practices sua
sponte. Rather, the agency investigates allegations made by "charging parties." Any
person may file a charge. Board Rule 102.9. Once the NLRB issues a complaint in
connection with a charge deemed meritorious at the administrative level, "any person
aggrieved" by the subsequent decision of the agency may obtain court review of the
administrative determination. 29 U.S.C. §160(f). But the fact remains that nothing will
happen without a charging party.
47
351 N.L.R.B. 225 (2007)
48
331 N.L.R.B. 9 (2000)
49
Toering arose in the context of the "September Massacre," a term coined by
organized labor for the group of roughly 61 cases decided in management's favor during
September 2007 by the "Bush Board." See Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The
Latest Battle in the War on Workers' Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act (May
2008) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133607
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important salting case to date, the Court held that a salt could be both an
employer's employee and a professional union organizer seeking to organize
that employer's employees. 50 In Toering, the NLRB held that its General
Counsel had the burden of proving that a job applicant was "genuinely
interested" in an "employment relationship" with an employer to establish
entitlement to statutory protection against hiring discrimination. 51 A
corollary of the holding is that an applicant seeking employment merely for
the purpose of exposing an employer's unlawful hiring practices or
obtaining a backpay award is entitled to statutory protection only under
unusual circumstances.
To consider the difficulty with the rule one need only think of a
discharge case. Imagine an employee who has been hired but who has no
genuine interest in remaining with an employer for more than a day (for
whatever reason). Imagine further that the employee is discovered by the
employer discussing unionization with fellow employees, and that the
subject employee is promptly discharged for that reason. I am unaware of
any rule that would require the NLRB to prove that the employee was
genuinely interested in continuing employment at the time of the discharge
to make out a violation. Stated somewhat differently, I am unaware of a
rule that would deny the employee the protection of the NLRA if the NLRB
could not prove such genuine interest. 52
Leaving substance aside momentarily, the parrying in Toering may have
left casual observers of the NLRB wondering why salting has continued to
provoke litigation. Two reasons predominate. First, prior to the NLRB's
recent decision in Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 53 the prospect of
comparatively large back pay awards prompted litigation of many salting
50

Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 94-95.
As a practical litigation matter, the burden of proof question will decide many cases.
Placing the burden on the Government of establishing in the first instance an applicant's
genuine interest in employment, as the Board majority did in Toering, leaves the agency
prosecutor, the NLRB General Counsel, in the position of having to guess what inferences
may ripen into “defenses” that must be disproven, since the employer has free rein to litter
the record with suggestions of the "non-genuine." Although the NLRB majority described
methods by which the General Counsel might meet the initial burden of genuineness, it is
evident that vague contours of illegitimacy have opened broad vistas of opportunity for
even marginally adroit defense counsel.
52
The NLRB has, however, placed the burden on the General Counsel to prove, after a
successful adjudication, that salts unlawfully discharged from employment have continuing
entitlement to backpay, see Oil Capitol Sheet Metal infra at n.54 and accompanying text,
reversing the previous longstanding rule. Tualatin Electric v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 714, 718
(D.C. Cir. 2001) ("The principle that the party who has acted unlawfully should bear the
burden of producing evidence for the purpose of limiting its damages has as much force in
a case involving salts as in any other.")
53
349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (2007)
51
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cases that became relatively expensive to settle. 54 Second, and probably
more importantly, salting provides a fertile battleground in which
aggressive union agents come directly into contact with equally resistant
employers. The visceral encounters between these front line emissaries is
symbolic and serves as a showcase for the public of the untidy reality that
labor-management conflict is alive and well; 55 and that unions continue to
be willing to actively combat anti-union employers.
Well before the recent salting controversies, the Supreme Court had
acknowledged that employers' refusals to hire job applicants because of
union affiliation were a major impediment to union organizing and a threat
to industrial peace. 56 However, the NLRB's predilection to view salting as
a vaguely illegitimate union exercise in inflicting economic injury on nonunion employers is revealed in Toering 57 and in the NLRB's "impact
analysis" categorizations 58 – explicit directions to NLRB investigators
about which cases are deemed most important at the investigative stage.
54

Under the then existing "moonlighting doctrine," wages paid to a salt by his union
were earnings from secondary employment which, consistent with the NLRB's general
moonlighting rule, were not offset against the salt’s gross backpay. Ferguson Electric Co.,
330 N.L.R.B. 514, 517 (2000). A union salt discriminatorily not hired, or discharged after
hire, could limit a post-discrimination work search (necessary to establish continued
eligibility for gross backpay) to non-union employers. These employers would often refuse
to hire the now loudly overt union salt, creating the possibility of additional unfair labor
practice charge filings, and the opportunity for multiple, often concurrent, backpay awards.
In some NLRB regions this practice was honed to a fine art. This writer has spent many an
afternoon dutifully attempting to calculate backpay awards in such tangled circumstances.
55
As the late musical legend Frank Zappa said with respect to jazz, "[it] is not dead; it
just smells funny." Frank Zappa, Be-Bop Tango (Of the Old Jazzmen's Church), Roxy &
Elsewhere (DiscReet Records, 1974)
56
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 supra n.30 and accompanying text.
57
According to the Toering plurality, ". . . [salting] applicants have been accorded
statutory employee status and have been alleged as 8(a)(3) discriminatees even when they
have engaged in conduct clearly intended to provoke a decision not to hire them, or have
engaged in antagonistic behavior toward the employer that is wholly at odds with an intent
to be hired." 351 NLRB at 230. This dicta must be kept in perspective, however, since
close scrutiny of some of the cases cited will reveal that many of the most colorful
“antagonisitic behavior” allegations were only ambiguously credited, see e.g. Smucker
Company, 341 NLRB 35 (2004), a case in which I appeared as trial counsel. From my
vantage point in that case, the sage administrative law judge, Benjamin Schlesinger, did not
appear to believe any witness in the case beyond what was absolutely necessary to resolve
the convoluted issues presented.
58
NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 02-02, December 6, 2001 (concluding that
allegations of unlawful refusals to hire should be given lower investigative priority than
charges alleging unlawful discharges because the necessary evidence in refusal to hire
cases "is generally peculiarly within the knowledge or possession of the employer, and thus
not readily available. Therefore, investigations of such issues necessarily are often more
time consuming and difficult than most discharge cases.")
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The ameliorative aspects of salting campaigns are, however, much more
subtle.
Salting campaigns are in important respects an unintended consequence
of the courts’ dramatic abrogation of prior labor policy by denying unions’
access to employees’ workplaces. The Supreme Court's 1992 opinion in
Lechmere v. N.L.R.B 59 eliminated access by non-employee union organizers
to employers’ property except in the very rare cases where “no reasonable
alternatives” exist. Most commentators agree that as a practical matter the
opinion banished unions from most workplaces. 60
If experienced,
professional union organizers have no access to employers' property during
traditional organizing campaigns, the opportunities for unions to organize
are almost by definition severely circumscribed. 61 And the denial of access
has gone even further. One court (as of this writing) has recently concluded
that unions are forbidden from attempting to identify unorganized
employees by viewing their license plates as they enter their employers'
facilities, 62 further underscoring the "cone of silence." 63
The arrival of the twenty-first century does not compel the conclusion
that unions denied workplace access by courts will never regain it. 64 On the
contrary, salting might best be thought of as a very early glimmer of unions'
twenty-first century responses to judicial denial of their physical access to
59

502 U.S. 527 (1992)
For a careful consideration of the Lechmere opinion see Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor,
Property and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994); Roberto L.
Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73
DEN. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066-70 (1996). (explaining how Lechmere encouraged broadened
salting, and seeing in both the Lechmere and Gilmer cases the Supreme Court’s “growing
inclination against interpreting civil rights laws broadly in the public interest as it once
did.”)
61
This is to take nothing from the view that no traditional organizing campaign can be
achieved without a strong core of "inside" employees. It is merely to point out the
diminished likelihood that such a core could obtain adequate direction – especially in the
early stages of an organizing campaign – without the aid of professional organizers who
have "seen it all before."
62
Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that union's recording
license plate numbers in employee parking lot and using them to obtain employees'
addresses from motor vehicle records during organizing drive violated Driver's Privacy
Protection Act).
63
On the critical relationship between employees' ability to organize and their ability
to communicate with each other and with others see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication
Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective
Action (forthcoming UC Davis L. Rev.)
64
Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 108 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“One of the
eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to get
the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to
get his services for the least possible return.”)
60
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employees. 65 To be sure, union organizers' uncovering of unlawful hiring
practices in the process of salting results in imposition of economic sanction
that a wrongdoing employer might characterize as unjust, though that label
does not withstand scrutiny. 66
The more interesting question is whether salting activity with no
organizational objective in the traditional sense is unprotected by the
NLRA. 67 The premise underlying such a case is that a union undertakes
salting activity solely because of suspicions that an employer will commit
unfair labor practices, and thus filing a charge will lead to backpay liability
and payment of attorneys' fees. Assuming the premise to be correct,
holding an employer accountable for unlawful discrimination has a
fundamental organizational objective, for it removes an illegitimate obstacle
to union organization in unorganized workplaces. Removal of such
obstacles facilitates any union's ultimate organizational objective of
organizing all unorganized employers in a given industry. 68
Even in the narrowest sense of "organizational objective," however –
the "hot shop," workplace by workplace model now so widely disfavored by
contemporary unions 69 – Toering in effect holds that, because the filing of
unfair labor practice charges may be motivated by "non-organizational"
objectives in salting cases, the General Counsel carries the prima facie
burden of proving the "bona fides" of all salts in all salting cases. 70 This
rule is in severe tension with Town & Country. In that case the Court never
doubted that an employee's organizational objectives might come into
65

The construction industry – where salts have primarily operated – may simply have
been a precursor to the broader "new" economy as Professor Jim Pope describes it:
It seems clear that there has already been a paradigm shift in business
organization. The old model of geographically fixed, bureaucratic, industrial
companies operating primarily in national markets no longer prevails. There is
uncertainty about what has replaced it, but some elements seem fairly clear.
Flexibility and mobility - including mobility across national boundaries - have
replaced predictability and stability as core values in business organization.
Corporations increasingly resist long-term attachments of all types. Large-scale
bureaucracies, which assign functions to internal divisions, are giving way to core
firms that assign functions to "independent" contractors. In employment, the old
imperative of retaining experienced workers is now less of a concern than the
capacity to shed excess workers or recruit new ones in response to fluctuating
market conditions. Pope, Next Wave Organizing at 516.
Salting campaigns, in addition to being a reaction to denial of access, might also be thought
of as early reactions to the new volatile economy.
66
See infra at III.C
67
I will have more to say about this infra at III.D.
68
Again, infra at III.D.
69
See infra n.203 and accompanying text.
70
See Toering at 239
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conflict with employment duties. But, "[a] company faced with unlawful
(or possibly unlawful) [worker] activity can discipline or dismiss the
worker." 71 The critical point of Town and Country is that employees are
presumed employees until they have done something to remove themselves
from the protection of the NLRA. "After all, the employer has no legal
right to require that, as part of his or her service to the company, a worker
refrain from engaging in protected activity." 72 But Toering insists on a
presumption that a paid union organizer applicant – a statutory employee –
is "non-genuine," and requires the General Counsel to prove otherwise as
part of the case-in-chief.
2.

The Tester Digression

Both the majority and the dissent in Toering recognized that a salt
applying to a nonunion employer to obtain evidence of discriminatory
hiring practices was analogous to a tester applicant in Title VII and civil
rights contexts. 73 Not surprisingly, the two sides applied the tester analogy
quite differently.
The majority, consisting of Board members Battista, Schaumber and
Kirsanow, carefully confined the question of testers to the Title VII context,
and asserted that Title VII and the NLRA, while possessing some
similarities, “have distinct purposes and significantly different statutory
schemes to accomplish them.” 74 For example, the majority argued, “Title
VII protects 'individuals' from discrimination, while only those individuals
who are statutory ‘employees’ are entitled to the protections of the Act.” 75
Further, “under Title VII, Congress authorized an aggrieved individual to
act as a ‘private attorney general’ and to pursue claims of employment
discrimination by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and a civil action in court. No equivalent provision exists in
the Act, which vests exclusive prosecutorial authority in the office of the
General Counsel.” 76
The majority also argued that, “Title VII sweeps far more broadly than
the [NLRA], prohibiting not only acts of discrimination, such as
discriminatory refusals to hire, but also the segregation or classification of
any individual on the basis of impermissible criteria.” 77 Quoting the
71

Town and Country, 516 U.S. at 97
Id. at 96.
73
Toering at 231.
74
Id. at 232
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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Seventh Circuit's opinion in Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, 78 the
majority contended,
[T]esters have standing to sue [because] Title VII 'created a broad substantive
right that extends far beyond the simple refusal or failure to hire.' The Act
contains no comparably broad right. Hiring discrimination under the Act
simply cannot occur unless the individual actually was seeking an
employment opportunity with the employer. Thus, even assuming the Seventh
Circuit has correctly interpreted Title VII, the same interpretation of
antidiscrimination protection under the Act is not warranted. 79

Noting that the Kyles opinion had addressed testers' standing and not the
underlying merits of the suit, the majority asserted that the potential injuries
supporting standing in a Title VII suit – “humiliation, embarrassment, and
like injuries 80 . . . do not constitute ‘discrimination in regard to hire’ under
Section 8(a)(3), which requires proof that an employee's employment
conditions were adversely affected by his or her engaging in union or other
protected activities.” 81
The dissent, comprised of Board members Liebman and Walsh,
countered, “there is a compelling statutory interest in uncovering,
redressing, and deterring hiring discrimination under the National Labor
Relations Act, as under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, where ‘tester’
applicants have been held to have standing to bring hiring discrimination
claims.” 82 Arguing that the NLRB's prior standard for analyzing refusal to
hire cases adequately addressed the issue of an applicant's genuine desire to
obtain employment, the dissent noted that the Seventh Circuit had rejected
the claim that Title VII required job applicants to have a bona fide interest
in working for the employer to which they applied in order to establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination. 83 The dissent additionally
observed that the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had
adopted the position at the agency level that testers have standing. 84 The
dissent also squarely disagreed with the majority concerning the scope of
78

222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that testers posing as job applicants to
gather evidence of discriminatory hiring practices have standing to sue)
79
Toering at 232
80
Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300
81
Toering citing Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
82
Toering at 240
83
Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, 222 F.3d at 300
84
Toering at 245, n.12 citing EEOC Notice No. N-915.002 (“Enforcement Guidance:
Whether ‘Testers' Can File Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination”)
(May
22,
1996),
1996
WL
33161339,
available
at
http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html
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the NLRA, arguing both that the broad employee definition of the NLRA
paralleled the protection of "individuals" under Title VII and that the
proscribed conduct under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA reached all
conduct however characterized tending "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 85
3.

Broader Assessment of the Tester Digression

To fully assess the competing arguments at play in Toering, a broader
perspective respecting testers is required. The important question is not
simply whether tester cases have primarily concerned standing, as the
Toering majority blithely concluded.
The use of testers reflects
substantively the general difficulty of uncovering the unlawful
discriminatory practices of even marginally sophisticated actors, which is
necessarily one policy of an anti-discrimination statute. By implication, if
testers are useful to eradicate discrimination in some statutory regimes, it is
difficult to understand why they would not be useful in others. Even more
broadly, the private party facilitation of statutory enforcement policy
directly implicates the private attorney general theme I have been fostering.
The use of testers originated in the housing discrimination context, and
the Supreme Court implicitly upheld the practice in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman. 86 In Havens, it was alleged that two testers had been provided
conflicting information regarding the availability of apartments in two
separate apartment complexes in Henrico County, Virginia. 87 It was further
claimed that the defendant realty company deliberately provided the
differing information because it wanted to steer black renters away from the
complexes: a black tester was informed that no apartments were available,
while a white tester was informed that the complexes had vacancies. 88 The
Fair Housing Act made it unlawful to refuse to rent a dwelling to any
person on the basis of race, but a threshold requirement for the finding of a
violation was that the putative renter must have made a bona fide offer to
rent. 89 Another section of the Act, however, made it flatly unlawful for any
entity covered by the Act “[t]o represent to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 90
85

Toering at 245, n.12 citing Waumbec Mills, Inc., 15 NLRB 37, 46 (1939), enfd. as
modified 114 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1940) (holding that discriminatory refusals to hire violated
statutory precursor to Sec. 8(a)(1))
86
455 U.S. 363 (1982)
87
Id. at 368
88
Id
89
Id. at 374 citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
90
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman at 373 quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)
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Thus, assuming the testers in the case had not made a bona fide offer to rent
an apartment, arguably removing them from coverage by § 3604(a) of the
Act, their receipt of unlawful misrepresentations appeared to bring them
within the purview of § 3604(d).
Still, the fact remained that the testers had not had any intention of
actually renting an apartment. The trial court summarily dismissed the
complaint, holding that the testers had no standing to sue under the Act
because they had not suffered a concrete injury. 91 Speaking to this
contention, the Supreme Court opined,
A tester who has been the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful
under § [3604](d) [of the Fair Housing Act] has suffered injury in precisely
the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing
to maintain a claim for damages under the Act's provisions. That the tester
may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would
receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a
home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of §
[3604](d). 92

In other words, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute itself defined
an injury that the plaintiffs had in fact suffered. While Congress might have
limited statutory beneficiaries under § 3604(d) to “genuine” apartment
seekers – as it had done in § 3604(a) – the Court was not willing to read a
genuineness requirement into an additional subsection, particularly since
Congress had demonstrated in the same section that it knew how to impose
such a limitation.
The Havens Court did not discuss in explicit terms the policy underlying
the use of testers in statutory discrimination cases, focusing instead on the
narrower threshold question of tester standing. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, in the underlying opinion, 93 explicitly considered the
policy implications of the use of testers. Noting their use in earlier civil
rights cases, 94 the court remarked,
91

Id. at 369
Id. at 373-74
93
Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980)
94
The court cited Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S.
202 (1958). The term “testers” was not used in the cited cases. The plaintiffs in Pierson
“actively sought integrated admission to the ‘whites only’ section of a bus station.” Coles
v. Havens Realty, 633 F.2d at 387. In Evers the plaintiffs “occupied seats in the forbidden
section of a bus.” Id. In Evers the Court wrote, per curiam:
92

A resident of a municipality who cannot use transportation facilities therein
without being subjected by statute to special disabilities necessarily has, we think,
a substantial, immediate, and real interest in the validity of the statute which

7-Oct-10]

UNION SALTS

20

The basic appropriateness of affording [the testers] standing to litigate today's
issues of fair housing parallels the importance of the right to litigate the
crucial issues decided in [the earlier civil rights cases]. . . There are, of course,
distinctions in the cases, but the binding similarity is that they all treat the
right of testers to challenge actions frustrating vital public policy where in
most instances no other effective challenge could be mounted. 95

Following the Havens litigation, the Seventh Circuit, in Richardson v.
Howard, cogently summarized the rationale for judicial approval of testers
in housing discrimination cases:
It is frequently difficult to develop proof in discrimination cases and the
evidence provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable. It is
surely regrettable that testers must mislead commercial landlords and
homeowners as to their real intentions to rent or buy housing. Nonetheless, we
have long recognized that this requirement of deception was a relatively small
price to pay to defeat racial discrimination. The evidence provided by testers
both benefits unbiased landlords by quickly dispelling false claims of
discrimination and is a major resource in society's continuing struggle to
eliminate the subtle but deadly poison of racial discrimination. 96

The limits of the standing concept announced in Havens are still unfolding,
but courts have extended the principle to employment discrimination cases.
In Tandy v. City of Wichita, 97 the Tenth Circuit held that testers had
standing to sue under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. As
previously noted, the NLRB observed in Toering that the Seventh Circuit
had approved tester standing in Title VII cases in Kyles. Relying expressly
on Kyles, the Eight Circuit, in Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 98 joined the
imposes the disability. That the appellant may have boarded this particular bus for
the purpose of instituting this litigation is not significant.
Coles at 387 citing Evers, 358 U.S. at 204
In Pierson, a group of clergymen traveled to Jackson, Mississippi, for the sole purpose of
testing their rights to nonsegregated public accommodations. The Coles court, quoting
Pierson with approval, stated, “(t)he petitioners had the right to use the waiting room of the
Jackson bus terminal, and their deliberate exercise of that right in a peaceful, orderly, and
inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking damages under section 1983.”
Coles at 387-88 citing Pierson at 558.
95

Coles v. Havens Realty Corp. at 387
712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir.1983)
97
380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004)
98
350 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2003)
96
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Tenth Circuit in conferring tester standing on a Title II ADA plaintiff. The
Shaver court rejected objections that the case before it should not be
allowed to proceed because the underlying claims by testers had been
artificially manufactured. The court agreed with the argument that the mere
fact of discrimination offended the dignitary interest that the ADA was
designed to protect irrespective of actual harm done to the plaintiffs in the
case. 99 The court secondarily noted that tester cases had been allowed to
proceed on a “private attorney general” theory. 100
Thus, the majority’s claim in Toering – that the tester principle is
narrowly limited to Title VII cases differing materially from cases
implicating NLRA policies – is an oversimplification. In reality, various
courts have agreed across statutory regimes with the necessity of utilizing
testers to remedy discrimination. While the arguments in tester cases have
centered on standing, there has been little policy disagreement on the need
to develop mechanisms to ferret out discrimination that is otherwise
difficult to reach. Moreover, the claim that testers do not have standing if
their objectives are merely to generate litigation has gained almost no
traction in the courts. In any event, because standing questions are
essentially irrelevant in administrative enforcement contexts, 101 a
conclusion by the NLRA that salts are entitled to protection on a private
attorney general theory is defensible on substantive grounds and could not
justifiably be defeated by standing objections.
Turning again to substance, Professor Yelnosky has advanced a
straightforward and compelling theory of why testers are necessary to
prevent unlawful employment hiring discrimination. 102 Yelnosky notes that
“[i]f victims of [employment] discrimination do not sue, employers have
less economic incentive to comply with the [relevant employment]
statute.” 103 A typical employment applicant may become discouraged by
subtly disparate conduct not easily recognized as potentially unlawful. An
employer may claim that it does not possess job applications, may interview
an applicant in a manner suggesting at the outset that it is not serious about
the applicant’s candidacy, or may attempt to steer the applicant to
undesirable jobs. 104 While an unsophisticated applicant might not recognize
the potential unlawfulness of such conduct, testers are typically trained to
detect a wide range of possible illegality. 105
99

Id. at 724-25
Id
101
See infra at Part II.
102
Yelnosky, Enforcement Void
103
Id. at 413
104
Id.
105
For a discussion of how certain employers have structured job application processes
to encourage applications from vulnerable Latino employees see Leticia M. Saucedo, The
100
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Salts are well positioned to prevent employment discrimination in the
NLRA context for the same reason as testers within the Title VII and civil
rights arenas. Indeed, salts are better positioned than testers in other antidiscrimination contexts precisely because they are not limited by the
standing doctrine. 106 Accepting that the NLRA and Title VII have differing
policies and statutory beneficiaries, each statute nevertheless prohibits
refusals to hire for proscribed statutory motivations. The Toering majority's
silence regarding similarities in the enforcement objectives of the two
statutory regimes represents a failure to address seriously the dissent's
private attorney general argument. One reason for the failure may be that
the majority simply did not have a persuasive response. Another reason for
the failure may be that the majority's conception of private attorneys general
was too narrow, and for that reason it is worth considering more fully the
nature of private attorneys general in order to critique more precisely the
majority's analysis.
II.

PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

To properly consider the tester argument in the context of the NLRA,
private attorneys general must be conceived in terms broader than those the
Toering majority was prepared to recognize. As I will discuss presently, the
essential private attorney general rationale requires little explanation. The
sticking point in many of the tester cases discussed in the previous Part has
been the standing of private attorney general plaintiffs. Indeed, it is for that
reason that the Toering majority could claim that the tester cases were
"about" standing. Toering’s private attorney general digression failed to
consider that administrative enforcement appears to allow for utilization of
private attorney general mechanisms unencumbered by the usual attendant
clutter of standing and attorneys fee issues. I first discuss the private
attorney general in broad contours and then move on to consideration of its
Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar
Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 961, 973-74 (2006). In reaction to salts’ significant
successes in defeating union avoidance techniques, employers went about the business of
developing hiring practices that had the practical effect of screening out union applicants.
For example, employers have successfully claimed that they only accepted applications
from referred applicants, or from applicants with no history of having earned wages in
excess of the rate of a presently available job opening. In one notable case, an employer
claimed, and the Seventh Circuit accepted, that it only accepted applications from
“unknown” job seekers “on Mondays.” Local 150 v. NLRB, 325 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2003).
The “Bush Board” was inclined to accept many questionable “neutral hiring policies.” See
e.g. Tradesmen International, 351 NLRB 399, 401 (2007) (upholding temporary service
employer’s preexisting policy that it only accepted applications from employees who
called ahead to arrange for an interview).
106
See infra at Part II.
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changed features in an administrative enforcement context.
The majority's analysis of the applicability of testers and private
attorneys general to the NLRA implicitly accepts some first principles in a
generic private attorney general discussion. That discussion must always
begin with the observation that an under-enforced statute is of little worth in
accomplishing the intent of its drafters. 107 Despite this truism, however,
decisions of federal regulatory agencies not to enforce statutes they have
been entrusted to implement are largely unreviewable in courts. 108 Some
agency decisions not to enforce concededly have more to do with the
agency's dearth of resources than with a substantive determination that a
potential enforcement option is meritless. 109 For this reason Congress, in
enacting various statutory schemes, has from time to time provided for
"private attorney general" mechanisms— provisions broadening the class of
persons or entities authorized to bring court actions, often styled as “citizen
suits,” to effectuate enforcement, often by paying their attorneys' fees,
thereby facilitating implementation of the policies of the underlying statutes
without the need for agency action. 110 In effect, the provisions authorize
private actors to pursue public statutory polices.
One threshold problem associated with private attorney general
provisions is the standing of a congressionally broadened plaintiff class to
bring court cases. Regardless the intended breadth of such provisions,
plaintiffs must have constitutional standing to bring court actions. 111
Standing obstacles to court actions may also arise by virtue of "prudential"
107

Obviously, visionary objectives of the original conceivers of legislation are not
consistently reflected in the resulting statutory sausage. See Michael Selmi, Public vs.
Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 1401, 1405-6 (1998) (explaining, in the course of a broader discussion on
government enforcement priorities, how the absence of meaningful remedies under an early
version of the Fair Housing Act resulted in unacceptably limited enforcement litigation).
For an analysis of the intent of the drafters of prototypical provisions of the NLRA relying
on early drafts of statutory language see Kenneth Casebeer, 11 Indus. Rel. L. J. 73 (1989).
108
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
109
Id. at 831. Agencies may lawfully, if disappointingly, decline to bring enforcement
actions for a variety of reasons, some of which are not obvious. For example, enforcement
decisions may be driven by the private, career eccentricities of agency attorneys. Selmi,
Public vs. Private Enforcement at 1442-47. Ultimately, however, the actions of agency
attorneys are governed by the overall enforcement priorities of their employing agencies.
110
“Since 1970, Congress has included provisions authorizing . . . citizen suits in
almost all of the environmental statutes it has passed.” Robin Kundis Craig, Will
Separation of Powers Challenges “Take Care” of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II,
Injury-in-Fact, “Private Enforcers,” and Lessons From Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO.
L. REV 93 (2001). For a discussion of the embrace of the private attorney general concept
in the Administrative Procedure Act see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan –
Of Citizen Suits, Injuries and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 181 (1992).
111
Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations at 297
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standing considerations. Plaintiffs possessing constitutional standing may
nonetheless be barred from bringing court actions when claims do not fall
within the “zone of interests” of an underlying statute, raise generalized
grievances, or seek to vindicate the interests or claims of third parties not
before the court. 112
Locating authorized plaintiffs to bring "concrete" claims seeking
statutory enforcement in the public interest may, accordingly, prove more
difficult than the drafters of private attorney general provisions had
originally anticipated. One facile explanation for the difficulty is that real
injuries are not occurring. But the enactment of private attorney general
provisions has demonstrated Congress's conviction, at least, that elusive
societal injuries may best be remedied by private action. 113
Statutory enforcement actions brought by administrative agencies
significantly alter the standing dynamic. Agency prosecutors by virtue of
enabling statutes have authority to litigate matters within the agency's
statutory mandate. 114 But situations may be presented in which agencies
deciding not to pursue individually filed administrative claims in court
because of a lack of resources, or because of a finding that a claim lacks
merit, nonetheless authorize administrative claimants to pursue court
actions by, for example, issuing "right to sue" letters. 115 Similarly,
administrative claimants who would arguably possess problematic standing
if their claims could initially be pursued in a court, might have enforcement
aims that agencies deem valuable on policy grounds.
The second situation, involving administrative claimants with
theoretically problematic court standing, is relevant to a discussion of union
salts. A frequently raised argument in the salting debate is whether a salt
without traditional organizational objectives can be injured within the
meaning of the NLRA. 116 This argument inadequately focuses on individual
112

Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)
113
See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV.
434, 442-43 (2007) (discussing the initial development of the private attorney general
mechanism as a progressive legal stratagem in aid of civil rights statutory enforcement);
but see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1401, 1454-55 (1998) (arguing that in
reality Fair Housing Act and Title VII enforcement mechanisms were deliberately limited
by Congress in a manner suggesting that it was primarily concerned with over-enforcement
rather than with under-enforcement)
114
See, e.g., Section 10(e) of the NLRA: “The Board shall have power to petition any
court of appeals of the United States . . . for the enforcement of [its] order . . .”
115
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, instructs the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to follow this procedure. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
116
Toering Electric Company, 351 N.L.R.B 225, 232 (2007) (arguing that injuries
cognizable in certain areas of employment discrimination law are not similarly cognizable
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injury to the exclusion of the broader public injury the NLRA was meant to
remedy. 117 Viewing salts within a larger public remediation context changes
the contours of the debate; and an evaluation of salts’ function as private
attorneys general leads to expanded public law considerations.
Professor Rubenstein has argued that there is a matrix of forms of
private attorneys general, and he maps their variety under three heads,
substitute attorney general, supplemental law enforcer, and simulated
attorney general. 118 The first and third of these forms are not relevant to
this discussion; substitute attorneys general “literally perform the exact
functions of the attorney general’s office,” 119 while simulated attorneys
general act on behalf of a class of persons but are “not substituting for the
attorney general, nor [are they] generally rewarded because [their] actions
contribute to a public good.” 120 Neither salts nor their tester analogues
perform the exact functions of the attorney general’s office, and are
therefore not “substitutes” within Rubenstein’s scheme. Salts, moreover,
seek to vindicate the broad policies of the NLRA, a statute enacted for the
public good, not by simulating the action of a prosecutor but by seeking its
aid, in this context the NLRB, the public prosecutor of the NLRA.
The supplemental form of private attorney general identified by
Professor Rubenstein, on the other hand, appears to more closely capture
the activity of salts. Supplemental private attorneys general are not paid for
their services by a government salary, but by their adversaries; 121 they are
clearly not representing the government, but pursue both public and private
interests. 122 While the existence of any private interest may call into
question the bona fides of the public interest, many cases have relatively
little at stake, 123 and pursuit of their scant interests is ultimately justified by
under the NLRA)
117
The NLRA explicitly defines its underlying policy as an attempt to remedy a public
injury:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
118

Rubenstein, What an Attorney General Is, 2145-55
Id. at 2145
120
Id. at 2154-55
121
Id. at 2152
122
Id.
123
See infra at III.C. for a discussion of backpay recovery by salts in comparison with
other schemes of “bounty” recoveries.
119
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a broad deterrent impact in the public interest. 124
As Rubenstein further notes, despite the apparent disfavor with which
courts have greeted the private attorney general model in recent years,
"supplemental attorneys general continue to play significant detection and
pursuit functions." 125 As examples of these functions, Rubenstein includes
qui tam relators, "who [are] authorized, in the first place, precisely because
it is believed that private parties (whistle blowers) will be in a better
situation to uncover fraud," 126 citizen groups in environmental enforcement,
and the pursuit of mass torts. 127 Indeed, the more one reflects upon the
matter, the more it emerges that the challenge to private attorneys general
has been fought on the narrow ground of standing, for reasons already
discussed, and on the issue of attorneys fees. 128
Regardless the undeveloped contours of the private attorney general
debate at the National Labor Relations Board, 129 considerations should not
be encumbered by standing analysis, for reasons explained in the Supreme
Court's opinion in EEOC v. Waffle House. 130 The issue in Waffle House
was whether an agreement between an employer and an employee to
arbitrate employment disputes defeated the EEOC's statutory jurisdiction to
pursue “victim-specific judicial relief” in an enforcement action under the
ADA. 131 The employee had signed a job application that broadly recited
that employment disputes would be resolved in arbitration. 132 When the
employee suffered a seizure fourteen days after employment, and was
discharged thereafter, he filed an ADA claim with the EEOC, but never
sought arbitration. 133
After an investigation, the EEOC filed an enforcement action in a

124

Rubenstein, What an Attorney General Is at 2152
Id.
126
Id. at 2151. A qui tam relator is a plaintiff authorized by statute to sue on behalf of
the Government. See Craig, Separation of Powers at 141-142
127
Id.
128
For an exhaustive treatment of the attorneys fees issues in private attorney general
litigation see Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine - State
Cases, 106 A.L.R. 5th 523 ("The private attorney general doctrine rests upon the
recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the
fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions and that,
without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorneys fees, private actions to enforce
such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.") (citing
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5)
129
See supra at Section I.B.2
130
534 U.S. 279 (2002)
131
Id. at 282
132
Id. at 282-83
133
Id. at 283
125
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Federal District Court. 134 The employee was not a party to the case. 135 The
EEOC's complaint alleged that Waffle House "engaged in employment
practices that violated the ADA," and requested injunctive relief to
“eradicate the effects of [the employer's] past and present unlawful
employment practices,” and also sought backpay, reinstatement, and
compensatory and punitive damages for the employee. 136 Waffle House
filed a petition under the Federal Arbitration Act to stay the EEOC's suit
and compel arbitration, or to dismiss the action. 137
The District Court denied Waffle House's petition to stay on the theory
that an agreement to arbitrate had not in reality been included in the
employment contract between Waffle House and the employee. 138 On
appeal, the Second Circuit held that the EEOC was not precluded from
challenging in court Waffle House’s employment practices, but was
precluded from pursuing victim specific relief on the employee’s behalf,
because such an action would contravene a valid agreement to arbitrate,
impugning the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA. 139
Taking the case up on certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the
proposition that the EEOC could continue to pursue an enforcement action
in connection with Waffle House's employment practices and, contrary to
the Second Circuit’s conclusion, found that the agency was not precluded
from pursuing victim-specific relief.
According to the Court, an
individual's administrative claim was subsumed in the EEOC's public
prosecution of an alleged violation of law and once the agency had made
the decision to litigate in the courts it was the complete master of its own
case in the judicial forum. 140 The Court did not discuss issues of standing,
and the silence in that regard is noteworthy, for it arose in the context of
EEOC’s stated position that it was authorized to pursue a claim even when
the original administrative claimant declined to continue with his or her
case, leaving no individual claimant for a victim-specific remedy.
Unlike the EEOC, the NLRB's enabling statute, the NLRA, affords no
private right of action, and the agency at all times pursues a public mandate.
Under the NLRA, the NLRB prosecutor, the General Counsel, has exclusive
control over pursuit of NLRA court litigation, aligning NLRA enforcement
with the EEOC's claimant-less pursuit of cases. 141 Additionally, the NLRB's
authority to prevent unfair labor practices, with very limited exceptions,
134

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283
Id.
136
Id. at 283-84
137
Id. at 284
138
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284
139
Id. at 284-85
140
Id. at 291-92
141
NLRA Section 3(d)
135
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“shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise.” 142 Thus,
even more than is the case with the EEOC's procedures, it is the NLRB's
province – not that of a court – to determine whether public resources
should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief. 143 Waffle
House teaches that, once the determination of resource expenditure has been
made, the standing of original administrative claimants, including, by
extension, salts, is irrelevant to subsequent court litigation. Victim-specific
relief may be pursued even in the absence of a victim.
Accordingly, the private attorney general question is significantly
simplified in administrative contexts. If the enabling statute authorizes the
agency to proceed in a judicial forum standing concerns are nonexistent,
and it can take its victims – provided they are employees, which is the
question Town & Country resolved – as it finds them. Furthermore,
entitlement of salts to attorneys' fees, the other ground of the private
attorney general battle in the courts, is not of significance. The Government
by statute is the attorney in administrative enforcement actions.
Thus, it is this "administrative" aspect of the private attorney general
conception that the Toering majority appears never to have considered. The
majority failed to explain why the NLRB is without authorization to ensure
statutory protection of patterned, strategic charge filing by private, statutory
beneficiaries precisely because the charge filing activity has the effect of
bringing into relief unlawful practices. To dismiss such a theory merely
because it is vaguely dissimilar from private attorney general litigation
transpiring in court-based litigation, as the Toering majority appeared to do,
at best glosses the point.
However, what an agency may do is not the same thing as what it
should do. Part III will now consider whether and when the NLRB has
legitimate reasons for not affording the NLRA protection at its disposal.
III.

IS SALTING "INDEFENSIBLE"?

As I have shown in the previous Part, no "administrative standing"
impediment to salts or their claims exists, so the problems typically present
in court-based private attorney general litigation are conspicuously
absent. 144 Under an administrative private attorney general theory, the
142

NLRA Section 10(a)
See supra at n.142 and accompanying text
144
See e.g. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997) (observing that the operation of
private attorney general provisions depends on textual evidence of a statutory scheme to
rely on private litigation). The analysis I am positing here requires no resort to such textual
evidence because private actors merely prompt public enforcement.
143
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NLRB may take advantage of salts' privately motivated union activity to
identify and root out unlawful hiring practices. The question remains,
however, as to whether the NLRB should nevertheless refuse – within the
limits of its discretion – to pursue certain types of salting claims because
they are "indefensible"? Historically, the NLRB has not been clear about
why certain types of apparently protected conduct are “indefensible,” so the
question warrants exploration. 145
It should be borne in mind that the NLRB need not – indeed, may not
under Town & Country – deny protection to salts in absolute terms to
neutralize them. The agency through its own devices can make salting
cases so difficult to prove that NLRB regions become discouraged from
issuing administrative complaints, rendering it effectively fruitless for
unions to file salting charges. The NLRB's recent course suggests it is
taking this approach, apparently on the view that certain forms of salting are
inherently indefensible. 146 The contours of the agency's indefensibility
instincts are murky. To the extent that these outlines can be articulated,
they probably involve equitable considerations evoked when certain
categories 147 of salting suggest general theories of entrapment, fraud, and
145

A very early example is Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1938) (finding an
employee slowdown in production "indefensible" though nothing in statute defined the
term). Nor, indeed, have the courts been clear. In a major case, N.L.R.B. v. Local Union
No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 471 (1953),
known to labor lawyers as the "Jefferson Standard" case, the NLRB and the Supreme Court
approved the discharge of employees who, without calling a strike, distributed handbills to
the public that disparaged the quality of an employer's product and business policies. The
employees' action was found to be a deliberate undertaking, beyond the protection of
Section 7, to alienate the employer's customers by impugning the technical quality of its
product. According to the NLRB these tactics were not related to the employees' interest as
employees in their bargaining dispute with the employer, and were "hardly less
indefensible than acts of physical sabotage." The Supreme Court upheld the Board by
answering a different question than had been raised in the proceedings below, viz. whether
the discharges were "for cause" within the meaning of Section 10 of the NLRA. Below,
the District of Columbia Circuit was of the view that, in employing the term indefensible,
"The Board, with the exception of one of its own decisions, draws only upon cases
involving such unlawful means as ‘sit-down strikes, sabotage, violence or similar
conduct.'" Local Union No. 1229, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 202 F.2d
186, 188-89, n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing cases). Thus, the Supreme Court allowed the
NLRB to expand an already vague term to deny statutory protection to conduct that was
never declared unlawful or explicitly removed from the protection of the NLRA. For
additional discussion of Jefferson Standard see infra n.197 and accompanying text.
146
See e.g. Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. at 14 (2007)
(dissenting opinion) (“The majority's new approach, in contrast, not only violates the wellestablished principle of resolving remedial uncertainties against the wrongdoer, but also
treats salts as a uniquely disfavored class of discriminatees, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's ruling that salts are protected employees under the National Labor Relations Act.”)
147
For what I mean by "categories" of salting see infra at Part III.D.
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unjust enrichment, or when salting campaigns fail to reveal a traditional
organizational objective. Each of these potentially "indefensible" categories
of salting are further examined in the following subsections.
A.

Entrapment

The NLRB has thus far not accepted the entrapment defenses raised by
employers in salting cases. Nevertheless, because the argument that salting
is tantamount to entrapment has surface appeal sufficient to cause the
NLRB to revisit the defense in the future, I explore it here. To restate a
classical formulation of the entrapment defense,
A law enforcement official, or an undercover agent acting in cooperation
with such an official, perpetrates an entrapment when, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of a crime, he originates the idea of the crime and then
induces another person to engage in conduct constituting such a crime when
the other person is not otherwise disposed to do so. 148

Typically cognizable only in criminal proceedings, some argue that the
entrapment defense has incrementally been extended to civil cases, though I
disagree. 149 Assuming for argument’s sake its applicability to civil cases,
however, the entrapment defense has been raised at the NLRB when a job
application has so prominently reflected an applicant's union affiliation that
it may reasonably be inferred that the applicant anticipated an adverse
action by the employer. 150 In one of the several iterations of litigation
involving the Sunland Construction Company in the 1990s, for example,
sixteen applicants applied for work on a construction site and prominently
reflected on their job applications that they were union organizers. 151
Sunland argued that the applicants had an ulterior purpose for applying and
that, "the placement of the term 'voluntary union organizer' on the
applications, and the fact that some were already employed, further
demonstrates that employment was not really desired." 152 In response to this
148

Sorrells v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435
See Yelnosky, Enforcement Void at 476. (citing three civil cases in which courts
entertained an entrapment defense). The clear majority rule seems to be that “[e]ntrapment
is not a civil cause of action; entrapment is only a defense to a criminal action.” See e.g.
Kondrat v. O’Neill, 815 F.2d 78, 1987 WL 36390 (6th Cir. Feb. 17, 1987)
150
Unambiguous revelation of union affiliation would tend to defeat in advance any
contention that an employer did not know of or suspect the affiliation, thereby buttressing a
refusal to hire prima facie case. But, it has been argued, the applicant's interest in litigation
reflects lack of a genuine interest in actual employment. See, e.g., Sunland Construction
Co.,
151
Sunland Construction Co., 311 NLRB 685, 700-701 (1993)
152
Id. 701-02.
149
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argument, Administrative Law Judge replied,
If the ulterior purpose was based on a belief that the Respondent would
discriminatorily deny the applications, then the Company by its actions
confirmed this belief. Respondent's position amounts to an argument that an
employee's suspicion that an employer is unlawfully motivated constitutes a
defense to an unfair labor practice charge. This has no support in Board
law. 153

But under classical doctrine there is a more telling response to the
entrapment argument. Because unions, and not the NLRB, engage in
salting activity, employers raising the entrapment defense would have to
demonstrate that union applicants are the agents of the NLRB. 154 I have
found no cases in which an employer seriously undertook such a daunting
showing. To the extent entrapment troubles the agency's thinking about
salting cases, even if on a subliminal level, it is unwarranted.
B.

Fraud

The argument that an applicant’s concealment of union organizational
objectives is “indefensible” because fraudulent has superficial appeal but is
likely foreclosed under present NLRB law. “A lie about . . . union status or
unionizing objective is not material because . . . an employer cannot turn
down a job applicant just because he’s a salt or some other type of union
organizer or supporter.” 155 Still, the NLRB might attempt to reverse the
course of labor law in this respect, and has the authority to do so providing
it explains itself. 156
Outside of labor law environs, the question of whether employment
application misrepresentations are fraudulent under state law has arisen in
the context of investigative journalism. In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 157 undercover television reporters working for the ABC
153

Id. at 703
See U.S. v. McClernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1108-09 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting “indirect
entrapment” defense because, assuming it applied in circuit at all, there was no evidence
that alleged entrapper was following actual or implied instructions of the government).
155
Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, 280 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 2002);
see also American Residential Services of Indiana, 345 N.L.R.B. 995, 1004 (2005)
156
After all, NLRB findings of indefensibility are baffling. See supra n.42 and
accompanying text. For an explanation of the latitude given agencies changing position for
policy reasons see Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 Boston U. L. Rev 189, 229-30
(“In some cases . . . a Board’s modification or development of law or policy can turn
almost fully on a discretionary policy balance rather than on the particular accuracy of
different assumptions about the current reality of labor relations.”)
157
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999)
154
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television program PrimeTime Live, “after using false resumes to get jobs at
Food Lion, Inc. Supermarkets, secretly videotaped what appeared to be
unwholesome food handling practices. Some of the video footage was used
by ABC in a PrimeTime Live broadcast that was sharply critical of Food
Lion.” 158 One argument raised in the ensuing litigation was that the
undercover reporters had engaged in fraud, within the meaning of North
Carolina law, 159 by making misrepresentations on their resumes. 160 In
response to the argument, the Food Lion court, relying on the “employment
at will” doctrine, 161 argued that it was unreasonable for either the employee
or the employer to assume that the employment would last for any
particular period of time in the absence of an explicit agreement. 162 Thus,
while it was obvious that the investigators had misrepresented aspects of
their background they had not made any representations about how long
they would work for the employer, and, consistent with the employment at
will doctrine, the employer had not requested any. 163 For this reason the
court concluded that, even if Food Lion had suffered injury through reliance
on the investigators’ misrepresentations, 164 fraud could not be established
because any reliance on assumptions respecting the duration of employment
was not reasonable. 165 Just as in Food Lion, an employer's reliance on the
158

Id. at 510
Id. at 512 (“To prove fraud under North Carolina law, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant (1) made a false representation of material fact, (2) knew it was false (or
made it with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity), and (3) intended that the plaintiff rely
upon it. In addition, (4) the plaintiff must be injured by reasonably relying on the false
representation.”)
160
Id. The investigators submitted applications with falsified identities, references,
and addresses. They also omitted reference to their simultaneous employment with ABC,
and misrepresented educational and employment credentials. Id. at 510. While state fraud
theories are not precisely applicable to a salting discussion because of principles of field
preemption, see Hartman Bros., supra, 280 F.3d at 1113 ( “. . . if interpreted to entitle an
employer to turn down a job application on the basis of a lie about salt status, the [Indiana]
statute would be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because it would interfere
with union organizing activity without any justification consistent with the Act.”), the
manner in which the Food Lion court disposed of the state claims is nevertheless broadly
instructive.
161
Employment at will is “Employment that is usually undertaken without a contract
and that may be terminated at any time, by either the employer or the employee, without
cause.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
162
Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 513
163
Id.
164
Food Lion purportedly incurred administrative costs of $1,944.62 by employing the
investigators. The costs stemmed from routine hiring expenses such as “screening
applications, interviewing, completing forms, and entering data into the payroll system,”
but included extraordinary costs allegedly resulting from the misrepresentations, including
“lower productivity and customer dissatisfaction.” Id. at 512
165
Id. at 513
159
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misrepresentations of salts could be injurious only if it were reasonable. To
the extent that indefensibility is premised on the notion that salts
misrepresent their genuine interest to be a longer-term employee – which
appears to be the thrust of the Toering majority 166 – the argument is at
variance with the at-will doctrine. In the absence of contractual duties to
the contrary, salts are at liberty to leave employment at any time, as is any
other employee.
The Food Lion case is instructive additionally on the question of
whether reliance on misrepresentations made during the hiring process rise
to the level of actionable injury. It is commonly argued in the Title VII
context that employment testers cause an employer to incur costs in
reviewing and processing the applications of employees who have no
interest in employment. 167 But, as the Food Lion court observed,
Our colleague . . . argues that the administrative costs attributable to
[the investigative reporters] should be recoverable as fraud damages.
To reach that result, the dissent would fundamentally alter the atwill employment doctrine by qualifying an employee's right to quit
at any time. According to the dissent, [the reporters] induced Food
Lion to hire them and spend money to train them by impliedly
representing (as at-will job applicants) that (1) they intended to work
indefinitely, until [there was] a change in circumstances and that (2)
there was a possibility that they would become long-term
employees. But these implied representations that the dissent would
impute are in essence representations about the potential duration of
employment, and here they would translate into an obligation to
work longer than a week or two. Such an obligation is inconsistent
with, and cannot be enforced under, the at-will employment
doctrine. Thus, when Food Lion, as an at-will employer, incurred
the administrative expenses, it took the full risk that [the reporters]
might do what any at-will employee was free to do (and what many
at Food Lion did) – quit within a very short time. 168 In other words,
the argument proves too much. 169
166

Toering, 351 N.L.R.B. at 225 (“. . . we define an applicant entitled to statutory
protection against hiring discrimination as someone genuinely interested in seeking to
establish an employment relationship with the employer.”)
167
See Yelnosky, Enforcement Void at 446.
168
Food Lion, 194 F.3d 514 n.2
169
Justice Breyer advanced a similar argument in the Town & Country opinion in
response to an argument that salts should not be treated as statutory employees because of
the increased risk that they might quit:
If a paid union organizer might quit, leaving a company employer in the
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Accordingly, a finding of salting indefensibility premised on a fraud theory
hangs necessarily on a very slender reed, and the NLRB should not
explicitly or implicitly take it seriously.
C.

Unjust Enrichment

It seems obvious that effective private attorneys general, of whatever
variety, must be compensated in some fashion to encourage them to pursue
their implementing strategies. 170 Union salts may, under present law, obtain
both a backpay award and their pay from the union as professional
organizers, and employers have argued that this is unjust enrichment. 171
But the NLRB has not thus far agreed that it is, and has allowed arguable
double recovery through operation of the “moonlighting doctrine”, though
the reasons for that doctrine are unrelated to a theory of private attorney
general compensation. 172 As previously noted, 173 the moonlighting doctrine
has probably impacted the frequency with which salting cases are litigated,
because cases can become too expensive to settle. 174
lurch, so too might an unpaid organizer, or a worker who has found a better job, or
one whose family wants to move elsewhere . . . a company disturbed by legal but
undesirable activity, such as quitting without notice, can offer its employees fixedterm contracts, rather than hiring them “at will” as in the case before us.
Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 96-97.
170

For a discussion of how poorly the private attorney general provisions of the ADA
have fared in the absence of predictable damage awards see Michael Waterstone, A New
Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 448 (2007).
171
At least one employer has attempted a state court challenge of a salting campaign
premised on many of the indefensibility theories in this section, including unjust
enrichment. See Wright Electric, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1999) (dismissing union’s
unfair labor practice charges challenging this state law suit). The argument is usually cast,
however, in terms of whether salts have adequately mitigated backpay liability. Because
salting campaigns are directed against non-union companies, some have argued that the
failure of salts to apply for employment with unionized companies represents a failure to
mitigate, depriving the salts of the right to backpay during the period of the refusal.
Former Board Member Hurtgen, in his influential dissent in Ferguson Electric, argued that,
while it should not be presumed that union salting campaigns require salts to refuse
employment in a disqualifying manner, the burden should be shifted to the union to prove
mitigation, modifying the usual rule that employers bear both the burden of persuasion and
production in the liability phase of an NLRB unfair labor practice proceeding. 330
N.L.R.B. 514, 519 (2000) (dissenting opinion). But mitigation at its core means that the
victim of the wrongdoer should not be unjustly enriched.
172
NLRB Compliance Casehandling Manual, Section 10552.6.
173
See n. 61 and accompanying text
174
After salts were determined to be employees in Town & Country, supra n.18 and
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In its traditional aspect the moonlighting doctrine is not controversial.
Imagine a part-time cab driver who begins working full time at a factory
after becoming a cab driver. Imagine further that the driver is subsequently
unlawfully fired for engaging in union activity. In that situation (Situation
1) the earnings the driver would continue to earn as a driver are not charged
against gross backpay owed because they are not “interim earnings,” i.e.,
earnings replacing those that were lost as a result of the discharge. 175 If the
same employee had never held a driving job, was fired, and then obtained a
driving job to replace earnings lost as a result of the unlawful discharge, the
earnings would be charged to gross backpay because they are interim
earnings, producing a lower net than in the first situation. (Situation 2) The
salary paid to a salt by the union for engaging in salting activities has been
treated as Situation 1 earnings. 176 The notion that salts are unjustly
enriched under even uncontroversial moonlighting scenarios derives from a
limited conception of salts as individual employees suffering from discrete
instances of discrimination that are adequately remedied in isolation. When
salts are viewed as playing a broader role in the enforcement of the NLRA
by engaging in strategic charge filing, the question of unjust enrichment is
substantially altered.
Allowing remedies to salts who are actually discriminated against, but
accompanying text, there were really only two ways that backpay awards in salting cases
could be limited. The NLRB could by agency rule deem the moonlighting doctrine not to
apply to salts. That result was difficult to defend once the Supreme Court held salts to be
statutory employees. Alternatively, the backpay period could be truncated, particularly in
the construction industry, where employing contractors frequently are engaged in multiple
jobs of short duration. See Dean General Contractors, 285 NLRB 573 (1987). Under prior
law, the burden had been placed on the wrongdoing employer to establish that a
discriminatee would not have continued in employment on one of the employer’s other
jobs. Id. This burden was often difficult for employers to carry, and victims of
discrimination often remained entitled to backpay for as long as an offending employer’s
construction projects continued. Ferguson Electric Co., 330 NLRB 514, 515-16 (2000). In
Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (2007), the NLRB placed the burden
of proving whether a salt’s employment would have continued on the wrongdoing
employer's other jobs on the General Counsel. Although the calculation of gross backpay
occurs at the compliance stage in a case decided on the merits, see N.L.R.B. v. Mastro
Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 176 (2nd Cir. 1965), pre-decisional backpay calculation has
significant impact on whether a case will be tried. If the NLRB calculates backpay that is
less than the cost to try the case, the employer will probably settle the case informally.
Minimal review of these administrative backpay calculations is available, and Regional
Directors have broad authority to accept such settlements over the objection of the union,
with such acceptance obviously acting as a deterrent to the filing of future salting charges.
Further, if the NLRB accepts the claim that a job has "ended," the employer may have no
obligation to instate or reinstate a salt.
175
Pusey, Maynes & Breish Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 482, 487 (1936)
176
NLRB Compliance CHM 10552.6
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who serve the additional role of informing the NLRB of the existence of
unlawful employment practices, is hardly morally repugnant, if widespread
practice in other environments is to be one’s guide. Informant reward
provisions have become commonplace in varied statutory enforcement
regimes. 177 As Professor Thompson noted in the context of environmental
enforcement, “Absent informants government inspectors would find it hard
to detect a vast collection of . . . opaque violations.” 178 Of course, society
has a general repugnance for “snitches” and violations of privacy. 179 But, in
the end, bounty schemes survive in spite of moral hazards because they
work. 180
In the salting context, any “bounty” is effectuated through the normal
operation of the traditional backpay mechanism, and individual backpay
awards are dwarfed when compared to sums potentially available under
reward provisions in other regulatory regimes. The Internal Revenue
Service, for example, will pay informants as much as $10 million in various
circumstances. 181 Private sector corporations seeking enforcement of
software licenses similarly understand the value of paying handsomely
employee informants to reveal violations of the terms of the licenses. The
177

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 226 (2000).
178
Id. at 226
179
Id. at 226
180
Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and
Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1999).
181
See IRS Pub. 733:
The Area Director will determine whether we will pay a reward and its amount. In
making this decision, we will evaluate the information you gave in relation to the facts we
developed by the resulting investigation. We will pay claims for reward in proportion to the
value of the information you furnished voluntarily and on your own initiative with respect
to taxes, fines, and penalties (but not interest) we collect. We will determine the amount of
the reward as follows:
1. For specific and responsible information that caused the investigation or, in cases
already under audit, materially assisted in the development of an issue or issues and
resulted in the recovery, or was a direct factor in the recovery, the reward shall be 15
percent of the amounts the Service recovers, with the total reward not exceeding $10
million.
2. For information that caused the investigation or, in cases already under audit, caused
an investigation of an issue or issues, and was of value in the determination of tax liabilities
although not specific, the reward shall be 10 percent of the amounts the Service recovers,
with the total reward not exceeding $10 million.
3. For general information that caused the investigation or investigation of an issue or
issues, but had no direct relationship to the determination of tax liabilities, the reward shall
be 1 percent of the amounts the Service recovers, with the total reward not exceeding $10
million.
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Business Software Alliance 182 entices these employees to "nail your boss"
by informing it about software piracy. 183 In 2005, the BSA offered $50,000
rewards to employee informants in the United States, and raised the limit to
$1 million in 2007. 184 The treatment by the NLRB of backpay prior to
Toering and Oil Capitol – while sufficiently provocative to agitate the
employer community – was a far cry from being punitive, or from the
bounty existing in other public and private enforcement schemes. 185 Surely,
the creative utilization of conservative backpay mechanisms should not be
deemed so "unjust" as to justify an NLRB finding of indefensibility,
particularly since they cannot come into play until an employer has been
adjudicated a wrongdoer.
D.

Purposes Unrelated to Organizing

Despite the fact that salting is protected activity, and should not be
found indefensible on entrapment, fraud, or unjust enrichment rationales,
the NLRB may come to think that salting is otherwise indefensible when it
is "unrelated to organizing." In the D.C. Circuit's formulation of this
theory, for example, salting may be rendered unprotected if it is an
“organizational activity [that] is a subterfuge used to further purposes
unrelated to organizing, undertaken in bad faith, designed to result in
sabotage, or designed to drive the employer out of the area or out of
business.” 186 Some of this language is difficult to assess, though other
portions of the language are uncontroversial to most of the labor law
community. No one questions that sabotage is unprotected under the
NLRA. The balance of the D.C. Circuit’s formulation is more problematic.
It is difficult to agree, for example, that all conduct meant to drive an
employer out of business is undeserving of NLRA protection. 187
182

The members as of June 2010 are Adobe, Altium, Apple, Autodesk, AVEVA,
AVG, Bentley Systems, CA, Cadence Design Systems, Cisco Systems, CNC Software Mastercam, Corel, Dassault Systèmes SolidWorks Corporation, Dell, Graphisoft, HP, IBM,
Intel, Intuit, Kaspersky, McAfee, Microsoft, Mindjet, Minitab, Progress Software, PTC,
Quark, Quest, Rockwell Automation, Rosetta Stone, SAP, Siemens, Stone Bond
Technologies, Sybase, Symantec, Synopsys, and The MathWorks.
183

Brian Bergstein, Piracy crackdown targets small businesses: Business Software
Alliance offers $1 million rewards to whistleblowers, MSNBC.com (November 26, 2007)
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21981822/ (last visited July 7, 2010).
184
Id.
185
To put things in perspective, as a nine-year NLRB attorney (1997-2006) I rarely
encountered salting cases valued as much as $25,000.
186
Casino Ready Mix, supra, 321 F.3d at 1198.
187
There is, after all, always a risk that union activity will put a company out of
business. For example, in the context of strikes it has been observed that, "the strike is a
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Furthermore, the meaning of "bad faith" is elusive. The question of what
activity is legitimately related to "organizing" also evades precision and
relies heavily on preconceived ideas.
On the question of bad faith, George W. Bush’s N.L.R.B. plainly did
not accept that salting activity meant to “provoke” an employer into
committing an unfair labor practice could be legitimate organizing
activity. 188 In fairness, this position is not new or limited to Republican
dominated panels of the NLRB. In reality, indefensibility arguments
premised on provocation are a logical extension of an earlier, Clinton-era
NLRB concurring opinion, 189 in Aztech Electric, 190 authored by Board
member John Truesdale, an opinion that is an unusually frank agency-level
exposition of the salting issue.
Member Truesdale admitted that unions have an interest in organizing
all non-union employers, and that such a goal is legal even where it would
tend, for example, to reduce the competition unionized employers face from
non-union employers. 191 Chief Justice Taft, writing in 1921, would have
agreed with this somewhat obvious point, for in making it in his own way
he said:
To render [a combination of employees] at all effective, employees must
make their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many
legitimate weapon, designed to strip the employer of economic control. The labor laws
recognize that a strike may drive an employer out of business." Crowe and Associates, 713
F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1983).
188
Indeed, it is quite explicit in its intent to quash any argument along these lines:
The Board does not serve its intended statutory role as neutral arbiter of
disputes if it must litigate hiring discrimination charges filed on behalf of
disingenuous applicants who intend no service and loyalty to a common enterprise
with a targeted employer. Instead, the Board becomes an involuntary foil for
destructive partisan purposes. The Congressional goal of industrial peace through
the “friendly adjustment of industrial disputes” is not furthered by extending the
Act's protections against hiring discrimination to such applicants. . . .We seek to
discourage cases where unfair labor practice allegations of hiring discrimination
are filed for this objective. We therefore believe that a change in law is warranted
so as to better insure against it.
Toering Electric Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231
The opinion was decided in the early days of the G.W. Bush administration by
remnants of the Clinton Board.
190
335 N.L.R.B. 260 (1981)
191
Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616 (1975) ("This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other
than organizing as many subcontractors as possible . . .This goal was legal, even though a
successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the competition that unionized
employers face from nonunion firms.")
189
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as may be in the same trade in the same community united, because in the
competition between employers they are bound to be affected by the standard
of wages of their trade in the neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all
lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership and especially among those
whose labor at lower wages will injure their whole guild. 192

Thus, it has never really been doubted that in order to survive unions need
to organize as broadly and as vigorously as possible. The difficult followup question is whether attempts by unions to eliminate low cost, non-union
employers – an ultimate goal that sounds “bad” – is anything more than a
defensive, ultimately organizational tactic aimed at preserving and
improving union standards – an ultimate goal that sounds “good,” or at least
familiar.
For Member Truesdale, the non-organizational (and thus illegitimate)
nature of the salting activity in Aztech Electric was established because
[T]he avowed overarching objective of inflicting . . . economic injury on
nonunion employers like [the employer] and its contractor clients [was that
they will go out of business or at least cease doing business within [the
union]'s jurisdiction; and . . . as a principal tactic to achieve this objective, the
[union] generat[ed] . . . as many unfair labor practices as possible, without
regard to their merit, in order to impose heavy legal expenses on targeted
employers. 193

For this reason, Truesdale concluded “that these factors are separate from,
and in some degree in conflict with [the union’s] organizational
objectives.” 194
But when moved to explain why the filing of unfair labor practice
charges – even those eventually found meritless – evinced a nonorganizational objective, Member Truesdale merely restated Jefferson
Standard’s vague formulation that “even otherwise protected activity ceases
to be protected if conducted in an excessive or indefensible manner.” 195
192

American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209

(1921).
193

Aztech Electric, 335 N.L.R.B. at 274
Id.
195
Id. at 275. Professor Finkin has captured the conceptual inappropriateness of
applying Jefferson Standard's insistence on employee loyalty to prospective employees.
In Five Star Transportation, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007), the NLRB denied instatement to
three school bus drivers previously employed by a school district's predecessor busing
subcontractor to the school district's contemplated successor busing subcontractor. It was
undisputed that the three drivers had complained to the school district regarding the
claimed bad reputation of the successor. But the complaints occurred before the drivers
had applied for employment with the successor; indeed, they occurred before the successor
was even awarded the busing contract. In supporting the dissent's argument that Jefferson
194
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But why is charge filing indefensible? Member Truesdale’s ultimate
conclusion was that “the [union]'s goal of deliberately inflicting serious
economic injury on nonunion employers is unnecessary to any of the
union's legitimate interests.” 196 Serious economic injury occasioned by
legal fees (or from back pay liability), however, may result precisely
because a substantial argument has been raised that an employer has
violated the NLRA. Competent counsel should be able to procure
expeditiously a dismissal of clearly non-meritorious charges. 197 On the
other hand, if it appears that an employer had mixed motives for not hiring,
or for firing, a salt, a defense counsel’s job becomes considerably more
involved, and therefore expensive. 198 In that event, however, it seems
untenable to suggest that the filing of arguably meritorious unfair labor
practice charges should deprive a discriminatee of the protections – or of the
evidentiary presumptions – of the NLRA. This conclusion appears correct
even before consideration of the D.C. Circuit’s prior acceptance of the
NLRB’s pre-Toering rule that salting activity unabashedly designed to
provoke unfair labor practice charges is protected. 199
Rejection of the charge filing, bad faith theory does not, of course,
explain how salting is organizational. One might preliminarily object that,
Standard's loyalty rationale could not apply in the absence of an existing employment
relationship, Professor Finkin observed that it has never been law that an employee owed a
duty of loyalty to a prospective employer, or, indeed, that any servant owed any duty to a
"master" with whom there is no contractual relationship. It is difficult to evade Professor
Finkin's larger point that the law in accepting a rule of this kind sanctions a species of 21st
century labor blacklisting. The reasoning appears equally applicable to salting contexts in
the sense that one should not be able to argue, with Member Truesdale, that salt-applicants
may be denied the protection of the NLRA because they are disloyal, for until they are
hired there is no basis to speak of a duty of loyalty. Matthew W. Finkin, Disloyalty - Does
Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 567-68 (2007)
196
Id.
197
The standard practice during investigations, with which I am intimately familiar by
virtue of my previous employment with the NLRB, is for an employer to submit a brief
written statement of position. It is not customary for charged employers to make witnesses
available in these kinds of cases. Meritless cases are quickly dispatched. Even the lowest
category cases must be resolved within 12 weeks or risk being assigned internally to the
agency’s “overage” list. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum 02-02 (December 6,
2001).
198
However the burden shifting mechanism is constructed, the ultimate task of counsel
will be to demonstrate that the employer would not have hired (or would have fired) the
applicant or employee even in the absence of union activity.
199
Progressive Elec. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.3d. 538, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Casino
Ready Mix 321 F.3d at 1197-98 citing M. J. Mechanical Services, 324 N.L.R.B. at 813-14;
Godsell Contracting, 320 N.L.R.B. 871, 874 (1996); accord, on slightly modified
“entrapment” theory, Bat-Jac Contracting, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 112 F.3d 503 (2nd Cir. 1996)
(rejecting on facts the claim that union agents induced employer to violate Act and
questioning whether defense existed under NLRA).
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in light of Town & Country, a union should have no obligation to explain
the organizational efficacy of salting, as it has no obligation to explain the
"reasonableness" of any activity protected under the NLRA. 200 Moving
beyond that objection requires a bit more exploration of the categories
salting assumes. At the first level of conceptualization, salting is either
covert or overt. At the next level of conceptualization, salting is either
shorter-term or longer-term.
Longer-term, covert salting, transpiring over an extended period of time,
most closely resembles the “hot shop” organizing with which the NLRB
seems most comfortable. 201 In these cases, which I shall term here category
I salting cases, clandestine salts after being hired in a workplace, make
common cause with co-workers, and do not disclose their identities until
and unless enough support has been garnered among employees to support
the filing of an NLRB petition. 202 If an employer discharges a salt following
disclosure in these circumstances, the cases are relatively easy for the
NLRB's General Counsel to prove because of the comparatively long
200

See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16 (1962) (". . .the
reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activity is irrelevant to the
question of whether a labor dispute exists or not."). The NLRB has not imposed
historically a "reasonable means" requirement on the exercise of concerted activity. Accel,
Inc., 339 NLRB 1052 (2003).
201
Professor Janice Fine defines hot shop organizing as a reactive “approach in which
unions respond to shops that reach out to them whether or not they fit within the union’s
core industry, rather than sticking to a proactive strategy to increase density within their
industry.” Janice Fine, Low-Wage Workers, Faith-Based Organizing, Worker Centers and
‘One Big Movement’ in Dan Clawson’s The Next Upsurge, 31 CRIT. SOC. 407, Issue 3
(2005) available at http://crs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/401.pdf (last visited June 26,
2010). As Professor Fine further notes, many of the most aggressive and innovative unions
have been eschewing this approach. Id. Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has explained that
the NLRA has worked best when jobs were “well-defined and long-term,” a situation not
inhering in a new economy in which “employees have less long-term interest in the job and
thus less incentive to organize a particular employer [and may not want to] incur the risks
and costs of organizing a particular employer when they may well be working for a
different employer next year[.]” Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of
Collective Representation: The Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
903, 910, 916 (2007). See also Andrew W. Martin, Resources for Success: Social
Movements, Strategic Resource Allocation, and Union Organizing Outcomes available at
http://sociology.osu.edu/people/awm/SP_08.pdf ("Unlike NLRB elections, which have a
clearly established “script” that unions must follow, non-NLRB organizing varies
dramatically depending upon the targeted firm . . .")
202
A petition must be supported by 30% of employees in a potential “bargaining unit.”
The matter is complicated in the construction industry that is typically the setting of salting
cases because employers and unions are authorized under Section 8(f) of the NLRA to
enter into pre-hire agreements. Ironically, it is precisely the most “organizational seeming”
salting scenario that carries the greatest potential for bitterness and acrimony, for the salt
will have practiced a longer running deception.
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duration of the employment. Attempts by an employer to prove that salts in
this category were not “genuinely interested in employment” are generally
unavailing because they had in fact been performing service sufficiently
adequate to continue them in employment. 203 Furthermore, a sustained
discussion to persuade employees in a discrete workplace to support the
union seems classically organizational.
Overt salting cases, on the other hand, which I will term here category II
salting cases, seem least akin to traditional union organizing, for here the
objective is to deliberately put employers on notice of applicants’ union
affiliation in the hope that employment will be swiftly, clumsily, and
unlawfully refused. The typical procedure will be for a salt to reveal
prominently on the employment application that he or she is a "volunteer
union organizer," or some similar formulation. 204 These are cases in which
the General Counsel has a more difficult mission in trying to prove an
applicant's genuine interest in employment because, the argument goes, the
applicant would not have revealed union affiliation if there was genuine
interest in obtaining a job.
Falling in between category I and II salting cases are shorter-term,
covert cases, which I will denote here as category III cases. In these cases,
covert salts are successfully clandestinely – one may say accidentally –
hired and, after quickly ascertaining the nature of an employer’s business
dealings, tactically reveal their union affiliation. In the prototypical case,
deliberately or accidentally "outed" salts in this category are abruptly
discharged after union affiliation disclosure. 205
The Toering majority in essence argues that category II salting has no
organizational objective because overt salts could not have a genuine
interest in establishing an employment relationship (though, of course, one
will never know because the possibility was preempted). This article
responds that category II salting is organizational because it actively
exposes and frustrates employers who remain non-union by unlawfully
203

An illuminating example is Allstate Power Vac, Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 111, slip
op. at 22 (2009) in which the NLRB dismissed all allegations involving a claimed unlawful
refusal to hire seven overt salts, remanded allegations concerning discharges and
discriminatory conduct directed at two shorter term covert salts that had been hired, and
found violations in connection with two longer term discharged employees who may or
may not have been covert salts. As I have mentioned, however, the NLRB has for the first
time begun to impose on the General Counsel the burden of proving the discharged salt's
ongoing entitlement to backpay. See supra n.53.
204
See e.g. J.O. Mory, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 604 (1997) (overturning ALJ's finding of
violation where union agents clearly and immediately revealed union affiliation on theory
that single departure from employer's purported practice of avoiding applicants with high
wage history insufficient evidence of pretext)
205
See e.g. Jesco, Inc. 347 N.L.R.B. 903, 914 (2005) (finding violation in connection
with two union salts fired within two days of revealing their union affiliation)
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excluding union-affiliated applicants, an objective previously held
paramount by the Supreme Court. 206 In truth, the NLRB should not even
presume that category II salts lack a traditional, hot shop organizing
objective. While that may turn out to be true, it may not. As
Administrative Law Judge Schlesinger stated regarding the category II salts
who were at issue in Smucker, "[The salts] truly wanted to work for [the
employer], albeit with the ulterior motive of trying to organize it from the
inside." 207
In sum, no category of salting should be treated presumptively as nongenuine job seeking activity. Assuming employer knowledge of union
activity, coupled with demonstrable anti-union animus, the burden should
fall on the employer to establish that it would not have hired a salt
notwithstanding union activity.
CONCLUSION

The NLRB's recent salting cases continue to treat "salts as a uniquely
disfavored class of discriminatees, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
ruling that salts are protected employees under the National Labor Relations
Act." 208 Even assuming that the pronouncements by recent incarnations of
the NLRB represent a permissible reading of the NLRA, the present Obama
appointees would do well to recognize salting campaigns as beneficial
enforcement catalysts. In light of the obvious under-deterrence of fully
mitigated NLRA backpay awards, 209 salting campaigns do no more than
restore the potential, if limited, deterrent effect of backpay that is fully
authorized by Section 10(c) of the NLRA. 210 Simply allowing the normal
206

Phelps Dodge, supra. n.30 and accompanying text.
Smucker Co., 341 N.L.R.B. 35, 40 (2004).
208
Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 slip op. at 14 (dissenting
opinion)
209
See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to SelfOrganization under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1789-90 (1983) (If the backpay
remedy were designed to deter the employer's unlawful conduct, there would be no reason
to deduct any wages that the employee earned, or could have earned, in another job. By
minimizing the employer's potential liability, such a deduction removes most of the
deterrent effect of the backpay award.")
207

210

Section 10(c) states in relevant part:

If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
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operation of relatively anemic statutory backpay awards in the context of
salting campaigns has been enough to cause a decade-long backlash against
salting. The backlash resulted precisely because salts were remarkably,
unexpectedly successful in uncovering unlawful employment practices. But
the overheated response to salting should be viewed in context as the
protests of those objecting to any meaningful enforcement of the NLRA.
After all, salting cannot harm an employer that has not violated the law.
Before the Toering case, salts had proven a unique form of private attorney
general, fitting well within the supplemental attorney general categorization
of Professor Rubenstein. 211 Unions in the twenty-first century will require
nimble, adaptive strategies to organize creatively in ever-changing
economic circumstances. To the extent the NLRB resists protection of
mobile salting campaigns because they do not seek immediate organization
of discrete workplaces in the outdated, hot-shop modality, it makes the
mistake of clinging to the past instead of reasonably applying intentionally
broad statutory language. Section 7 of the NLRA protects not only
employees' rights to engage in traditional collective bargaining, but also
their rights to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of other
mutual aid or protection. 212 Given the dizzying pace of change in the
workplace, the NLRB must read "other" back into the statute if it wishes to
avoid slipping over the brink of irrelevance.

action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act.
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See generally supra Rubenstein, On What A Private Attorney General Is
Section 7 of the NLRA states in relevant part:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. (Emphases supplied)

